## APPEAL NO. 020504 FILED APRIL 17, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing (CCH) was held on January 24, 2002. He determined that the respondent (claimant) was injured on \_\_\_\_\_\_; that he gave timely notice of his injury to his employer; and that he had disability from his injury beginning September 21, 2001, and continuing through the date of the CCH. The appellant (carrier) has appealed these determinations as against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence, and the claimant responds that the decision should be affirmed.

## DECISION

We affirm the hearing officer's decision.

Essentially, the carrier quarrels with the manner in which the hearing officer gave weight and credibility to the evidence. The hearing officer is the sole judge of the relevance, materiality, weight, and credibility of the evidence presented at the hearing. Section 410.165(a). The decision should not be set aside because different inferences and conclusions may be drawn upon review, even when the record, as in this case, contains evidence that would lend itself to different inferences. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied); American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Volentine, 867 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1993, no writ).

Section 409.001(a)(1) and (b) require that the injured employee give notice of an accidental injury to a person in a supervisory or management capacity within 30 days. However, the notice given, while it need not be fully detailed, should at a minimum apprise the employer of the fact of an injury and the general area of the body affected. Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Mathes, 771 S.W.2d 225 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1989, writ denied).

The record in this case presented conflicting evidence for the hearing officer to resolve. He could believe, however, that the meat processing activities in which the claimant was engaged on \_\_\_\_\_\_, caused his injury and that his employer was notified on this day. Furthermore, although the carrier argues that tendinitis and bursitis are ordinary diseases of life, no evidence was offered that such would be unrelated to trauma. In considering all the evidence in the record, we cannot agree that the findings of the hearing officer are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly wrong and unjust. In re King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660

(1951). We therefore affirm the decision and order.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **AMERICAN CASUALTY COMPANY OF READING, PENNSYLVANIA** and the name and address of its registered agent for service of process is

C.T. CORPORATION SYSTEM 350 NORTH ST. PAUL STREET DALLAS, TEXAS 75201.

	Susan M. Kelley Appeals Judge	
CONCUR:		
Chris Cowan Appeals Judge		
Philip F. O'Neill		
Appeals Judge		